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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
SOUTHERN DIVISION
STEVEN LAPIER,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 10-CV-2851 AW
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, 
MARYLAND, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Steven LaPier brings this action against the following Defendants: Prince 
George’s County, Maryland; Prince George’s County Police Department; and Roberto L. Hylton, 
Chief of Police of Prince George’s County. Mr. LaPier asserts a § 1983 claim founded on the 
First Amendment, along with disability discrimination claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973. Mr. LaPier also asserts claims under Maryland state law for disability 
discrimination, age discrimination, and wrongful or abusive discharge. Presently pending before 
the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary 
Judgment (“Motion to Dismiss”). The Court has reviewed the entire record, as well as the 
pleadings and exhibits, and finds that no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2010). 
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court takes the following facts from Mr. LaPier’s Complaint and construes them in a 
light most favorable to him. Plaintiff Steven LaPier is a resident of Anne Arundel County.
AUTHENTIC. 
U.S. GOVERN! 
INFORMAT]
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Defendant Prince George’s County (“County”) is a political subdivision of the State of 
Maryland. Codefendant Prince George’s County Police Department (“Police Department”) is the 
primary law enforcement agency for the County.
Mr. LaPier began training as a Student Officer at the Police Department on or about 
September 22, 2008. Around April 9, 2009, Mr. LaPier passed out during a training run. One or 
more doctors diagnosed Mr. LaPier with a blood disorder that causes anemia. Mr. LaPier 
resumed his normal training activities after a weeklong period in which his doctors permitted 
him to perform only light work. In a letter dated May 5, 2009, a doctor informed the Police 
Department that Mr. LaPier was fit to resume normal training activities.
The County Medical Board (“Board”) met on June 4, 2009. The Board reviewed Mr. 
LaPier’s medical records and determined him to be unfit for duty. The Board recommended Mr. 
LaPier’s separation from the Police Department. Roberto L. Hylton, Chief of Police for Prince 
George’s County, advised Mr. LaPier of the Board’s recommendation in a letter dated June 9, 
2009 and delivered on June 18, 2009. In the letter, Chief Hylton stated that he accepted the 
Board’s recommendation and intended to separate LaPier.
At an unspecified time before his separation, Mr. LaPier verbally advised Chief Hylton of 
alleged corruption that had taken place in the Police Department. The gravamen of Mr. LaPier’s 
complaint was that instructors had helped students cheat on exams.
On October 14, 2010, Mr. LaPier filed a Complaint containing six Counts. Count I asserts 
a claim under § 1983 for an alleged violation Mr. LaPier’s First Amendment rights. Count II 
asserts a state law claim for wrongful or abusive discharge. Count III asserts a claim for violation 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”). Count IV asserts a claim for ADA
2
Case 8:10-cv-02851-AW Document 19 Filed 09/27/11 Page 3 of 15
violations. Counts V and VI assert state law claims for, respectively, disability and age 
discrimination.
On November 29, 2010, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss. Mr. LaPier filed his 
Response on January 12, 2011, and Defendants filed a Reply on February 24, 2011.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint. 
See Edwards v. City o f Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999). Except in certain specified 
cases, a plaintiff’s complaint need satisfy only the “simplified pleading standard” of Rule 8(a), 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002), which requires a “short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
In two recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the standard applicable to Rule 
12(b)(6) motions. Compare Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), with Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). These cases clarify that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than 
a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8(a)(2)). This showing must consist of at least “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
In addressing a motion to dismiss, a court should first review a complaint to determine 
which pleadings are entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. “When 
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1954. In its 
determination, the court must construe all factual allegations in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999). 
The Court need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles Cnty.
3
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Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, 
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any 
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979). 
In sum, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, 
on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Preliminary Issues
1. Consideration o f Matters Outside o f the Pleadings
Defendants invite the Court to treat their Motion to Dismiss as one for summary 
judgment. The Court accepts this invitation in part and declines it in part. It is premature to 
evaluate the propriety of treating Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment 
in relation to Mr. LaPier’s federal claims because the Court dismisses all these claims without 
prejudice. The Court assesses the appropriateness of converting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
into one for summary judgment with respect to Mr. LaPier’s state law claims as the Court 
dismisses these claims with prejudice. The Court reserves this analysis for the section in which it 
analyzes the merits of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Mr. LaPier’s state law claims.
2. Whether the Police Department is Subject to Suit
Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) provides that the 
law of the state where the court is located determines the capacity to sue or be sued. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 17(b). Under Maryland law, it is well-established that county police departments are agents of 
the county and not treated as separate legal entities. See Clea v. Mayor and City Council o f Balt., 
541 A.2d 1303, 1306 (Md. 1988) (citation omitted) (stating that county police departments are
4
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agencies of the county), superseded by statue as recognized in, Balt. Police Dept. v. Cherkes, 
780 A.2d 410, 422-36; Hines v. French, 852 A.2d 1047, 1068 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) 
(citations omitted); see also Stewart v. Prince George’s County, Md., No. Civ.A. AW-01-302, 
2001 WL 759890, at *3 (D. Md. May 23, 2001) (citations omitted) (noting that the Prince 
George’s County Charter incorporates only the County as a legal entity). Accordingly, the Court 
dismisses Mr. LaPier’s § 1983 and ADA claims in relation to the Police Department.1
B. Federal Claims
Mr. LaPier asserts claims under (1) § 1983, (2) the ADA, and (3) the Rehabilitation Act. 
The § 1983 claim fails because Mr. LaPier failed to adequately allege that the County executed a 
policy or custom that caused the injury of which he complains. The ADA and Rehabilitation Act 
claims fail because Mr. LaPier failed to sufficiently plead that he is disabled.
1. § 1983 Claim
a. § 1983 Claim Against the County
In pertinent part, § 1983 provides as follows: “Every person who, under color of [law], 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by 
the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .” 42 U.S.C.A § 
1983 (West 2005) (emphasis added). In Monell v. Dep’t o f Soc. Servs. o f City o f New York, 436 
U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court determined that municipalities are persons under § 1983 and
1 It is premature to determine whether Mr. LaPier may sue the Police Department under the Rehabilitation Act. 
Some courts have held that state or local governments may not automatically incur liability for the discriminatory 
actions of subordinate actors or agencies under the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Schroeder v. City o f  Chicago, 927 
F.2d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 1991). Rather, for liability to attach, a sufficient nexus must exist between the entity on 
which the plaintiff seeks to impose liability and the alleged discrimination. Other cases indicate that Schroeder’s 
sufficient nexus rule is far from settled. These cases propose that respondeat superior liability applies to 
Rehabilitation Act claims. See, e.g., Rosen v. Montgomery County, Md., 121 F.3d 154, 157 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997). The 
Court cannot determine which of these lines of cases applies given the posture of the case. To be sure, information 
regarding the extent to which the County and/or Police Department receives federal financial assistance is necessary 
to resolve this question.
5
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that people can sue municipalities for damages on account of constitutional deprivations. 436 
U.S. at 690.
Yet municipal liability arises under Monell only where the alleged constitutional 
violation furthers a municipal policy or custom. Id. at 694; see also Walker v. Prince George’s 
County, Md., 575 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2009). Therefore, § 1983 plaintiffs must “identify a 
municipal policy[] or custom that caused [their] injury.” Id. (citing Board o f Comm’rs o f Bryan 
Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (quotations marks omitted)).
In this case, Mr. LaPier alleges that he had verbally informed Chief Hylton of corruption 
in the Police Department at an unspecified time before his termination. Mr. Lapier further alleges 
that Mr. Hylton fired him after this event. These allegations, in Mr. LaPier’s estimation, support 
the inference that Chief Hylton fired him in retaliation for speaking about a matter of important 
public concern.
This argument is unavailing. Mr. LaPier’s Complaint contains no allegations supporting 
the inference that this isolated action constitutes a policy or custom of the County. Furthermore, 
even if this single action could arise to a policy or custom for the purposes of Monnel, the Court 
cannot infer that the firing bore sufficient temporal proximity to the incident to justify an 
inference of causation. Mr. LaPier’s Complaint fails to provide a date—even an approximate 
date—when he verbally informed Chief Hylton of the alleged corruption in the Police 
Department. Furthermore, the Complaint furnishes no further factual context for this single 
action. Rather, the Complaint vaguely states that “[Mr. Lapier] had verbally reported said 
[corruption] to his superiors prior to [the firing].” In other words, the statement is a threadbare 
factual allegation that lacks a meaningful reference to actual events. These allegations “do not 
permit [the Court] to infer more than the mere possibility” of retaliation. See Walker, 575 F.3d at
6
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431 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). The mere possibility of a constitutional violation is 
insufficient to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Consequently, Mr. LaPier’s Complaint 
fails to adequately allege that the County is a person within the meaning of § 1983.
Mr. LaPier argues in his Response that his firing was part of a broader pattern of 
corruption in the Police Department. To support his position, Mr. LaPier references events that 
have allegedly taken place since he commenced this action. The problem with this argument is 
that these allegations appear nowhere in the Complaint. Therefore, although the Court harbors 
reservations about the viability of Mr. LaPier’s Monnel claim, the Court dismisses his Complaint 
without prejudice and affords him an opportunity to remedy its defects. 
b. § 1983 Claim against Hylton2
Defendants argue that qualified immunity insulates Chief Hylton from liability. The 
Supreme Court has articulated a two-step test to resolve qualified immunity claims. Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citation omitted). First, courts must “decide whether the 
facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right. Id. (citations 
omitted). Second, where plaintiffs satisfy the first step, courts must determine “whether the right 
at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id.
This case’s posture precludes the Court from applying this test. The Court has granted 
Mr. LaPier leave to amend his deficient Complaint with respect to his § 1983 claim. Although 
Mr. LaPier has alleged that Chief Hylton violated his First Amendment right to comment on
2 Defendants argue that Mr. LaPier sued Chief Hylton in his official capacity. Because suits against municipal 
officials in their official capacity constitute suit againsts the municipality itself, Defendants urge this Court to 
dismiss Mr. LaPier’s § 1983 claim against Chief Hylton.
This argument fails for two reasons. One, Mr. LaPier sued Chief Hylton in his individual capacity. Mr. LaPier 
explicitly states in the Complaint’s preamble that he sues Chief Hylton “individually” for violating his First 
Amendment rights. The clarity of this language ends the analysis. Second, naming a municipal officer in his or her 
official capacity is not technically incorrect even though a plaintiff need not do so to prosecute a claim of municipal 
liability. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1396 (4th Cir. 1987).
7
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matters of public concern, the precise nature of this right may depend on any new allegations Mr. 
LaPier may raise in his amended complaint. Cf. Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258, 271 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (stating that courts must define the right in question at a high level of particularity for 
the purposes of applying the qualified immunity test). Thus, it is premature for the Court to pass 
on the question of qualified immunity.
3. Disability Discrimination 
a. ADA
An individual can show that he is disabled in three ways, only two of which are relevant 
to this case, under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“2008 ADA”), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.). An individual can show that he suffers 
from “a physical . . . impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1)(A) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011). Alternatively, an individual 
can show that his employer regarded him as having such an impairment. Id. § 12102(1)(C). The 
Court assesses these arguments in turn.
i. Actual Disability
In pertinent part, the 2008 ADA defines disability as “a physical . . . impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities . . . .” Id. § 12102(A) (emphasis added). The 
2008 ADA does not define the phrase “substantially limits.”
Courts have first recourse to a statute’s legislative history where its text is ambiguous. 
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). The version of the 2008 ADA that the House of 
Representatives passed defined the phrase “substantially limits” as “materially restricts.” H.R. 
3195, 110th Cong. § 3(2) (2008), 2007 CONG US HR 3195 (Westlaw). The House report for 
H.R. 3195 states that this language sought to create a standard less demanding than “severe” or
8
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“significant.” H.R. Rep. No. 111-730, pt. 1, 2008 WL 2502300, at *10 (2008). Yet the Senate 
removed this language from the version of the bill that Congress ultimately passed. Compare 
S B. 3406, 110th Cong. §3(4)(B)(2008), 2007 CONG US S 3406 (Westlaw), with 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12102(4)(B) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011). Therefore, although the 2008 ADA evinces 
Congress’s intent to lower the threshold for demonstrating a disability, the impairment’s severity 
must rise above a floor of material restriction. Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 111-730, pt. 1, 2008 WL 
2502300, at *10 (2008) (stating that “‘materially restricted’ is meant to be . . . more than a 
moderate limitation”).
In this case, Mr. LaPier’s factual allegations fail to support the inference that his 
impairment constituted a substantial limitation. Mr. LaPier avers that he suffered from a blood 
disorder that was sufficiently severe to cause him to lose consciousness on one occasion, and that 
he could perform only light work for a week. Yet Mr. LaPier alleges that he “resumed his normal 
training routines” after the weeklong period of restriction. Likewise, Mr. LaPier contends that his 
physician advised the Police Department that “he was fit to resume his training” with the Police 
Department. In other words, Mr. LaPier’s Complaint contains no indication that his medical 
condition affected him beyond the week of light duty. Moreover, Mr. LaPier acknowledges that 
he managed to perform light work during his week of restriction. Notably, Mr. LaPier does not 
maintain that his medical condition is episodic or in remission. Cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4)(D) 
(West 2005 & Supp. 2011). These factual assertions are insufficient to state a plausible claim 
that Mr. LaPier’s medical condition constituted even a material restriction, let alone a substantial 
limitation, on a major life activity.
9
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ii. Perceived Disability
In pertinent part, the 2008 ADA provides that disability means being regarded as having 
an impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activity. See id. § 12102(1). An 
employee may satisfy this definition by showing that his employer subjected him to 
discrimination “because of a . . . perceived . . . impairment whether or not the impairment limits 
or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” Id. § 12102(3)(A). However, the 2008 ADA 
expressly states that the “regarded as” definition of disability “shall not apply to impairments that 
are transitory and minor.” Id. § 12103(3)(B). Transitory impairments are those with “an actual or 
expected duration of 6 months or less.” Id.
In the present case, the Complaint asserts that Mr. LaPier’s impairment affected him for 
only a week. Furthermore, Mr. LaPier fails to allege that his condition was episodic, in 
remission, or otherwise expected to last for a significant length of time. Therefore, as a matter of 
law, the impairment has an actual or expected duration of six months or less. Moreover, the 
allegations fail to sustain the inference that Mr. LaPier’s transitory condition was more than 
minor. According to the Complaint, the condition affected Mr. LaPier’s capacity to work for 
only one week, and Mr. LaPier still performed light duty during this week. Mr. LaPier further 
asserts that he resumed his normal work activities when he returned to work and that his doctor 
declared him fit to return to duty. For these reasons, the Complaint fails to state a plausible claim 
for perceived disability under the 2008 ADA.
b. Rehabilitation Act
The Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability 
. . . [shall] be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added). Courts use the same
10
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standards to analyze a claim for discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act as they do a claim 
for discrimination under the 2008 ADA. See 2008 ADA, Pub. L. 110-325, § 7(1), 122 Stat 3553, 
3558 (amending the Rehabilitation Act to incorporate the 2008 ADA’s definition of disability); 
see also Cochran v. Holder, No. 10-1548, 2011 WL 2451724, at *3 (4th Cir. June 21, 2011) 
(citations omitted). Thus, because Mr. LaPier fails to state a claim for disability discrimination 
under the ADA, it follows ipso facto that he fails to state a claim for disability discrimination 
under the Rehabilitation Act.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court dismisses Mr. LaPier’s disability discrimination 
claims. This dismissal is without prejudice and Mr. LaPier may file an amended complaint 
clarifying the factual basis of his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.
C. State Law Claims
Mr. LaPier asserts state law claims for age discrimination, disability discrimination, and 
wrongful or abuse discharge. All these claims fail in light of controlling Maryland authority.3 As 
the Court consider material that technically falls outside of Mr. LaPier’s Complaint, the Court 
treats Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment with respect to Mr. LaPier’s 
state law claims.
1. Propriety o f Treating Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as One for Summary 
Judgment
Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules provides that courts must treat 12(b)(6) motions as 
motions for summary judgment where the court considers matters outside the pleadings. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(d). In such cases, courts must give the defendant a “reasonable opportunity to present 
all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id. (emphasis added). The term “reasonable
3 The Court recognizes that Defendants based their Motion to Dismiss Mr. LaPier’s state law claims on several 
grounds. The Court need not reach the merits of all these arguments in view of its resolution of Mr. LaPier’s state 
law claims on just one of these grounds.
11
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opportunity” entails two basic requirements. One, the defendant must have some indication that 
the court is treating the motion as one for summary judgment. See Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 
177 (4th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). A defendant’s awareness that material outside the 
pleadings is pending before the court satisfies this notice requirement. See id. Two, courts must 
satisfy themselves that the nonmoving party has had a fair opportunity to discover information 
essential to oppose the motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 
(1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)).
In this case, the Motion to Dismiss’s alternative caption and attached exhibits satisfy the 
notice requirement. See Laughlin v. Metro Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260-61 (1998). 
Furthermore, the fairness requirement is satisfied because no amount of discovery would help 
Mr. LaPier withstand summary judgment. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Mr. LaPier’s 
Response are the only materials outside the pleadings that the Court considers in granting 
summary judgment for Defendants on Mr. LaPier’s state law claims. The Court does not rely on 
these legal briefs to resolve disputed facts. Rather, the Court considers them merely to highlight 
uncontestable procedural facts. For these reasons, the Court analyzes the merits of Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss under a summary judgment standard.
2. Standard o f Review for Motions for Summary Judgment under Rule 56(a)
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). The Court must “draw all justifiable inferences in 
favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded 
to particular evidence.” Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991) (citing
12
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., A ll U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). To defeat a motion for summary 
judgment, the nonmoving party must come forward with affidavits or other similar evidence to 
show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 415 U.S. 514, 58l (1986). A disputed fact presents a genuine issue “if the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 411 U.S. 
at 248. Although the Court should believe the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all 
justifiable inferences in his or her favor, a party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact 
“through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” Beale v. Hardy, 169 
F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985).
3. Law and Argument
The Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”) bars actions for unliquidated 
damages against local governments or their employees unless the plaintiff provides notice of the 
claim within 180 days after the injury. Md. Code Ann., Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 5-304 
(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2011). A plaintiff’s failure to plead satisfaction of the LGTCA’s 
notice provision is fatal to a disability discrimination action. Hansen v. City o f Laurel, 25 A.3d 
122, 131 (2011).
The plaintiff in Hansen sued the City of Laurel (“City”) for age and disability 
discrimination under Maryland state and local laws. Hansen, 25 A.3d at 124 n.3. The City moved 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. at 125. In its supporting memorandum, the City argued 
that Hansen failed to allege that he had complied with the LGTCA’s notice provision. Id. Hansen 
filed a response to the City’s motion in which he failed to address the City’s argument that he 
failed to plead compliance with the LGTCA’s notice provision. Id. Rather, Hansen argued that
13
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he had satisfied the notice requirement in fact. Id. The trial court granted the City’s motion and 
the appellate court affirmed Id. at 126-27.
The Court of Appeals granted Hansen’s cert petition. Id. at 127. The Court of Appeals 
declined to consider whether Hansen had actually complied with the LGTCA’s notice 
requirement. Id. at 129. Instead, the Court of Appeals addressed whether Hansen’s failure to 
plead compliance with the same barred his claim. Id. The Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff 
must expressly plead satisfaction with the LGTCA’s notice requirement to withstand a motion to 
dismiss based on the failure to do so. Id. at 124, 137.
The Hansen court acknowledged that “pleading satisfaction of the LGTCA notice 
obligation may not be evident immediately to a potential tort claimant.” Id. at 134. Yet the Court 
of Appeals cited several omissions on the part of Hansen that, in its estimation, mitigated the 
harshness of the case’s outcome. For instance, “the City advised Hansen of the pleading 
shortcoming through its motion to dismiss.” Nonetheless, Hansen neither amended nor moved to 
amend his complaint. Id. Nor did he voluntarily dismiss his Complaint and refile it. Id. In short, 
the Court of Appeals found no equitable considerations sufficient to spare Hansen from his 
obligation to plead compliance with the LGTCA’s notice requirement. See id. at 134-37.
The facts in this case are indistinguishable from those in Hansen. Here, as in Hansen, Mr. 
LaPier asserts age and disability discrimination claims under Maryland state law. Furthermore, 
both the plaintiff in Hansen and Mr. LaPier failed to plead satisfaction of the LGTCA’s notice 
requirement. Moreover, like the defendants in Hansen, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim. What is more, as with the defendants in Hansen, Defendants explicitly 
state that “LaPier does not allege . . . notice to the County of his intent to file suit” in their 
Memorandum in Support. (Doc. 6, at 18.) (Emphasis added.)
14
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None of the equitable considerations that the Hansen court mentioned are present in this 
case. Defendants notified Mr. LaPier that his Complaint was inadequate in their Memorandum in 
Support. Nevertheless, Mr. LaPier failed to move to amend his complaint, voluntarily dismiss his 
case, or take any other step evidencing the intent to comply with the LGTCA’s notice provision.
The preceding discussion demonstrates that (1) the relevant procedural facts are 
incontrovertible and (2) the incontrovertible facts entitle Defendants to judgment as a matter of 
law. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Mr. LaPier’s state 
law claims and dismisses these claims with prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the 
Alternative, for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 6.) Consequently:
(1) The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s state law claims with prejudice;
(2) The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claims without prejudice;
(3) The Court dismisses Counts I (§ 1983) and IV (ADA) of the Complaint in relation 
to the Police Department with prejudice.
An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will follow.
September 27, 2011_____  ____________ /s/___________
Date Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge
15
